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What Is “Like-Kind” for Real Estate?
-by Neil E. Harl*
 Since the earliest days of like-kind exchanges,1 the line between real property and depreciable 
tangible personal property has been indistinct, at best.2 Interestingly, the dichotomy between 
real and personal property is a creature of the Treasury regulations,3 not of the statute. The 
statute merely refers to “property”4 other than for separate provisions for real property and 
personal property indicating that foreign property is not “like-kind” to property located in 
the United States.5	Actually,	the	relevant	authority	has	identified	three	classes	of	property	
eligible for like-kind exchange treatment – (1) real property,6 (2) depreciable tangible personal 
property7 and (3) other personal property including intangible personal property.8
 The rules governing depreciable personal property embrace an elaborate system of 
classification	 as	 to	what	 is	 like-kind.9 Real property has never been subjected to such a 
classification	scheme.	A	recent	Tax	Court	case10 has focused attention on the need for a more 
finite	classification	system	for	real	property	in	the	context	of	like-kind	exchanges.11
The scope of “like-kind” exchanges of real property
	 The	regulations,	in	defining	what	is	“like-kind,”	starts	off	by	stating	that	the	words	“like	
kind” have reference to “. . . the nature or character of the property and not its grade or 
quality.”12 The regulations go on to state that whether real estate is improved or unimproved 
is immaterial.13  The regulations proceed to draw some lines in stating that an exchange of 
a leasehold with 30 years or more to run for a fee interest in real estate can be like-kind.14 
Rulings have contributed additional guidance in reciting, as examples,  that a remainder 
interest may be exchanged for a remainder interest in other farmland,15 a life estate in real 
property with a life expectancy of less than 30 years exchanged for a remainder interest in 
real property is not considered like-kind,16 a sale followed by a leaseback involving terms of 
30 years or more constitutes a like-kind exchange,17 and unharvested crops are considered 
part of the land on which they are growing and may be exchanged with the land for other 
qualified	property.18 Litigation has also contributed guidance with a purchaser’s rights under 
an installment contract apparently considered equivalent to a fee simple interest.19
 But that process has been slow and incremental with the authorities emerging over more 
than a half century and leaving interstices in the guidance. 
Peabody Natural Resources Co. 
 A Tax Court decision on May 8, 2006, Peabody Natural Resources Co. v. Comm’r,20 
addressed	yet	 another	 dimension	of	 the	 problem	with	 a	 significant	 enlargement	 in	what	
____________________________________________________________
  *  Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus Professor of Economics, 
Iowa State University; member of the Iowa Bar.
unchanged since 1924). See Harl, “Like-Kind Exchanges: A 
Popular Option for Property Transfers,” 11 Drake J. of Agric. L. 
25, n. 2 (2006).
 2  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2. See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural 
Law § 27.04 (2006); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16] 
(2006).
 3  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2.
 4  I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
 5  I.R.C. § 1031(h)(1), (2).
 6  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b).
 7  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(b).
 8  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c).
 9  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031-2(b)(2), (3); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 
1.1031(a)-2T(d)	 (four	and	six-digit	classification	system).	See	
Harl, “New Rules on Like-Kind Exchanges with Personal 
Property,” 15 Agric. L. Dig. 129 (2004).
 10  Peabody Natural Resources Co. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 261 
(2006).
 11  I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033(g)(1).
 12  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b).
 13  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b), (c).
 14  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c).
 15  Rev. Rul. 78-4, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
 16  Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 C.B. 467.
 17  Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 687.
 18  Rev. Rul. 66-209, 1966-2 C.B. 299.
 19  Starker v. Comm’r, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
 20  126 T.C. 261 (2006).
 21  Id.
 22  Id.
 23  Id.
 24  N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-107.
 25  Peabody Natural Resources Co. v.  Comm’r, 126 T.C. 261 
(2006).
 26  Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 671 P.2d 637 
(N.M. 1983).
 27  Peabody Natural Resources Co. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 261 
(2006).
 28  Id.
 29  Id.
 30  Ltr. Rul. 200424001, Dec. 8, 2003.
 31  309 U.S. 78 (1940).
 32  Id. at 82.
 33  Peabody Natural Resources Co. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 261 
(2006).
property is eligible for like-kind exchange treatment. In that case, 
operating gold mines, including real estate, were exchanged with 
operating coal mines in New Mexico which were subject to coal 
supply contracts that obligated the mine owner to provide electric 
utilities with coal.21 The owners of the mines treated the exchange 
as like-kind, including the coal supply contracts, as interests in 
real property.22 The Internal Revenue Service disagreed, arguing 
that the coal supply contracts were not real property.23
 The Tax Court conceded that minerals that are severed and 
removed from the land become personal property under the 
Uniform Commercial Code24 as contracts for the sale of goods. 
However, the court was enamored with the taxpayers’ argument 
that the coal supply contracts created servitudes under state law 
which can be interests in real property.25 Under New Mexico 
law, there are three requirements for an equitable servitude 
– (1) the covenant must “touch and concern” the land; (2) the 
parties must intend that the covenant run with the land; and (3) 
any successor against whom enforcement is sought must have 
“actual, constructive, or inquiry notice” of the covenant.26  The 
Tax Court found that the three requirements were met, the coal 
supply contracts created servitudes and the servitudes were real 
property interests under state law. 
 The Tax Court then proceeded to examine whether, given that 
the interests were real property, the interests were eligible for 
like-kind exchange treatment. The court agreed with IRS that 
just because an asset is an interest in real property does not mean 
that it is automatically eligible for like-kind exchange treatment.27 
The court then examined whether the nature and character of the 
transferred rights  in the properties were “substantially alike.”28 
The Tax Court concluded that the supply contracts could not be 
separated from the ownership of the coal reserves and the supply 
contracts were ancillary to the ownership of the coal reserves, 
holding that the supply contracts were like-kind to the gold mining 
property.29
 Role of state law
 The dominant role of state law in characterizing the contracts 
as real property means that what is considered real property, 
eligible for like-kind exchange treatment, could necessarily vary 
from state to state. That concern was addressed in a 2003 private 
letter ruling30 which cited to Morgan v. Commissioner31 for the 
proposition that “[i]n the application of a federal revenue act, 
state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest 
which the taxpayers had in the property or income sought to be 
reached by the statute.”32 
 The Peabody  case33 provides encouragement to broaden the 
scope of what is eligible for real property like-kind exchanges.  
Footnotes
 1  See Reg. 45, 1920 Ed., Act 1563 (regulations issued under the 
1918 Act provided that no gain or loss from the acquisition and 
subsequent disposition of property would be recognized unless 
there was a change of substance and not merely in form. The 
statutory nonrecognition of gain or loss in the case of property 
held for productive use or for investment has remained largely 
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